Contents, List of Illustrations and Tables, Members, and Staff
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Contents, List of Illustrations and Tables, Members, and Staff
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations and Tables ix
Member List xi
Staff List xiii-xiv
Preface xv
1. "WE HAVE SOME PLANES" 1
- 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1
- 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14
- 1.3 National Crisis Management 35
2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47
- 2.1 A Declaration of War 47
- 2.2 Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World 48
- 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988-1992) 55
- 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992-1996) 59
- 2.5 Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996-1998) 63
3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71
- 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71
- 3.2 Adaptation-and Nonadaptation-in the Law Enforcement Community 73
- 3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82
- 3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community 86
- 3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93
- 3.6 . . . and in the White House 98
- 3.7 . . . and in the Congress 102
4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108
- 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108
- 4.2 Crisis: August 1998 115
- 4.3 Diplomacy 121
- 4.4 Covert Action 126
- 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134
5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145
- 5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145
- 5.2 The "Planes Operation" 153
- 5.3 The Hamburg Contingent 160
- 5.4 A Money Trail? 169
6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174
- 6.1 The Millennium Crisis 174
- 6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182
- 6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole 190
- 6.4 Change and Continuity 198
- 6.5 The New Administration's Approach 203
7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215
- 7.1 First Arrivals in California 215
- 7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223
- 7.3 Assembling the Teams 231
- 7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics 241
8. "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED" 254
- 8.1 The Summer of Threat 254
- 8.2 Late Leads-Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266
9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278
- 9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 278
- 9.2 September 11, 2001 285
- 9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311
- 9.4 Analysis 315
10. WARTIME 325
- 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326
- 10.2 Planning for War 330
- 10.3 "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq 334
11. FORESIGHT-AND HINDSIGHT 339
- 11.1 Imagination 339
- 11.2 Policy 348
- 11.3 Capabilities 350
- 11.4 Management 353
12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361
- 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361
- 12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365
- 12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374
- 12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383
13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399
- 13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400
- 13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407
- 13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416
- 13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419
- 13.5 Organizing America's Defenses in the United States 423
Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429
Appendix B:Table of Names 431
Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439
Notes 449
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES
| p. 15 | FAA Air Traffic Control Centers |
| p. 15 | Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector |
| p. 32-33 | Flight paths and timelines |
| p. 49 | Usama Bin Ladin |
| p. 64 | Map of Afghanistan |
| p. 148 | Khalid Sheikh Mohammed |
| p. 238-239 | The 9/11 hijackers |
| p. 279 | The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 |
| p. 284 | The World Trade Center radio repeater system |
| p. 288 | The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations |
| p. 312 | The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 |
| p. 313 | The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77 |
| p. 313 | American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania |
| p. 413 | Unity of effort in managing intelligence |
COMMISSION MEMBERS
Thomas H. Kean, CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton, VICE CHAIR
Richard Ben-Veniste
Bob Kerrey
Fred F. Fielding
John F. Lehman
Jamie S. Gorelick
Timothy J. Roemer
Slade Gorton
James R. Thompson
COMMISSION STAFF
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
| Joanne M. Accolla Alexis Albion Scott H. Allan, Jr. John A. Azzarello Caroline Barnes Warren Bass Ann M. Bennett Mark S. Bittinger Madeleine Blot Antwion M. Blount Sam Brinkley Geoffrey Scott Brown Daniel Byman Dianna Campagna Samuel M.W. Caspersen Melissa A. Coffey Lance Cole Marquittia L. Coleman Marco A. Cordero Rajesh De George W. Delgrosso Gerald L. Dillingham Thomas E. Dowling Steven M. Dunne Thomas R. Eldridge Alice Falk John J. Farmer, Jr. Alvin S. Felzenberg Lorry M. Fenner Susan Ginsburg T. Graham Giusti Nicole Marie Grandrimo Douglas N. Greenburg Barbara A. Grewe Elinore Flynn Hartz Leonard R. Hawley L. Christine Healey Karen Heitkotter Walter T. Hempel II | C. Michael Hurley Dana J. Hyde John W. Ivicic Michael N. Jacobson Hunter W. Jamerson Bonnie D. Jenkins Reginald F. Johnson R.William Johnstone Stephanie L. Kaplan Miles L. Kara, Sr. Janice L. Kephart Hyon Kim Katarzyna Kozaczuk Gordon Nathaniel Lederman Daniel J. Leopold Sarah Webb Linden Douglas J. MacEachin Ernest R. May Joseph McBride James Miller Kelly Moore Charles M. Pereira John Raidt John Roth Peter Rundlet Lloyd D. Salvetti Kevin J. Scheid Kevin Shaeffer Tracy J. Shycoff Dietrich L. Snell Jonathan DeWees Stull Lisa Marie Sullivan Quinn John Tamm, Jr. Catharine S.Taylor Yoel Tobin Emily Landis Walker Garth Wermter Serena B.Wille Peter Yerkes |
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